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ABSTRACT
Almost twenty-five years after its gentle narrative first captured
the imagination of its readers, Carol Gilligan's In a Different Voice1
remains one of the most influential feminist works of all time. Its
articulation of different ways of understanding moral conflict and
self gave a voice to women who felt excluded or silenced by the mono-
phonic and abstracted hierarchy of traditional moral reasoning and
psychological theory.2 To some critics, however, the voice Gilligan
singles out is not only incoherent but also severely flawed. Its omni-
presence in conversations about difference threatens to tempt partici-
pants toward the dangers of essentialism. As critics and supporters
alike contemplate the fate of Arachne, Gilligan's webs of care and con-
nection are increasingly seen as archaic places of entrapment and even
death. Love it or hate it, however, the haunting omnipotence of its
narrative ensures that it continues to have operative effects. Indiffer-
ence is not an option; evasion is futile. It is perhaps time to revisit
its taken-for-granted familiarity and the habitual dismissals of its in-
sights and look again at the possibilities offered by a different voice.
This article seeks to utilize the aching familiarity and impend-
ing doom that pervades and threatens to stifle conversations ignited
by attempts of feminist legal scholars to articulate a different voice
in law. As these efforts to identify the woman lawyer's different voice
fall silent, it seems that, at least in terms of everyday practice, a dif-
ferent voice is more mythical than real. Neither a eulogy nor an
* Lecturer in law, Durham University, United Kingdom. Thank you to colleagues
who have taken the time to comment on this article in its various guises, many of whom
are, like Charlotte, not only great writers but great friends too. The usual caveats apply.
1. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S
DEVELOPMENT (Harvard University Press 1993) (1982).
2. Mary Sykes Wylie, The Untold Story: Carol Gilligan on Recapturing the Lost Voice
of Pleasure, 26 PSYCHOTHERAPY NETWORKER 46, 47-48 (2002).
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epitaph, the article utilizes E. B. White's Charlotte's Web,3 to offer an
alternative understanding of Gilligan's different voice as a fictional
device or myth. The article suggests that In a Different Voice retains
an ongoing promise to law (and other academic disciplines), which lies
not in its difference per se but rather in its ability to render contingent
particular, but dominant, forms of reasoning and decision-making.
INTRODUCTION
It is difficult to overstate the impact of Carol Gilligan's In a
Different Voice.4 Almost twenty-five years after the "elegant sensitiv-
ity" of its narrative first captured the imagination of its readers, it
has been described as one of the most influential feminist works of all
time.6 Its gentle articulation of different ways of understanding moral
conflict and self gave a voice to women who felt excluded or silenced by
the monophonic and abstracted hierarchy of traditional moral reason-
ing and psychological theory.7 In so doing, it struck "an emotionally-
resonant chord in a whole generation.. . who recognized themselves
in its pages - their own vague and undefined sense of not being
heard, of learning to put on their own 'pretend' voices."' It has since
sold over 750,000 copies worldwide and has been translated into seven-
teen languages.9 Its distinctive voice can be heard in the scholarship
of a vast array of academic disciplines, including computer studies,
health care, political science, environmental management, and law,
as well as in pop-psychology bestsellers exploring apparent differ-
ences between men and women.' ° For many, this is one "little book"
that lives up to its publisher's moniker: it "started a revolution."'"
To many other commentators, however, the voice Gilligan ar-
ticulates is not just unintelligible, but also dangerously misguided.
3. E.B. WHITE, CHARLOTTE'S WEB (Penguin Books 1963)(1952).
4. See GILLIGAN, supra note 1.
5. Catherine MacKinnon, in Isabel Marcus, et al., Feminist Discourse, Moral Values,
and the Law -A Conversation, 34 BUFF. L. REv. 11, 73 (1985).
6. Wylie, supra note 2, at 48.
7. See id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See generally JOHN GRAY, MEN ARE FROM MARS, WOMEN ARE FROM VENUS: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR IMPROVING COMMUNICATION AND GETTING WHAT YOU WANT IN YOUR
RELATIONSHIPS (1997); Alison Adam, Computer Ethics in a Different Voice, 11 INFO. AND
ORG. 231 (2001); M. C. Cooper, Gilligan's Different Voice: A Perspective for Nursing, 5
J. PROF. NURSING 10 (1989); Rita Mae Kelly, et al., Female Public Officials: A Different
Voice, 515 ANNALS 77 (1991); Bruce T. Lauber, et al., Gender and Ethical Judgments about
Suburban Deer Management, 14 Soc'Y & NAT. RES. 571 (2001).
11. Royce Carlton Incorporated, http://www.roycecarlton.com/speakers/gifigan.html
(last visited Mar. 24, 2007).
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Its sinister presence stalks conversations about difference, luring par-
ticipants into the quagmire of essentialism and exclusion. As femi-
nists dice with the fate of Arachne, Gilligan's webs of care and con-
nection are increasingly seen as outdated places of entrapment and
even death; her narrative and style emblematic of "the kind of fem-
inism ... [that is] out of synch with what today's tough-minded,
presumably long-since-liberated women want to read."'2 Its revo-
lutionary insights are dismissed as pass6 and subjected to routine
condemnation by "armchair-feminists" and others keen "to avoid ex-
amining too closely the question of [their] own 'feminine' identities"''
and distance themselves from its essential threat in favor of more
cutting-edge companions. There appears to be no middle ground. The
very ubiquity and simplicity of the idea of a different voice ensures
that indifference is not an option. Avoidance is futile. A choice must
be made: either to embrace its potential for liberation or to decry its
narrative as an essentializing myth.
Like most either/or choices, however, while perhaps initially
attractive, the love it or hate it critique of In a Different Voice is at
best somewhat simplistic and at worst brutally reductive. There is
clearly more to both the book itself and the continuing reactions to it
than these alternatives suggest. Its outmoded image belies the ex-
tent to which it continues to have operative effects in the context of
debates about difference and diversity, both in the law and beyond.
Moreover, there is a real danger that we know the story so well that
we do not really listen to it any more. 14 As Aesop warned, "familiarity
breeds contempt," 5 which could lead us to take the myth at face value
and allow the parody to usurp reality. It is perhaps time to revisit the
taken-for-granted familiarity of both its insights and detractors and
reexamine Gilligan's In a Different Voice.'6
12. Wylie, supra note 2, at 49.
13. Mary Joe Frug, Progressive Feminist Legal Scholarship: Can We Claim "A Different
Voice"?, 15 HARv. WOMEN'S L. J. 37, 50 (1992).
14. We may capture a number of communities here including, but not necessarily
limited to, women, feminists, lawyers, academics, and any combination therein. Although
the article seeks in both its content and style to invoke and explore a sense of relation-
ship and history, in so doing it risks not only over- and under- inclusiveness but also gives
the "constitutive we" the appearance of a coherence it does not posses. See Kim Lane
Scheppele, Foreword: Telling Stories, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2073, 2077-2085 (1989).
15. AEsOP, The Fox and the Lion, in AESOP'S FABLES 43 (Jack Zipes trans. & ed., 1992).
16. It is this feeling of hackneyed familiarity and weary resignation- the belief that
Gilligan has "been done" and that, as a result, further comment is not only unnecessary,
but may be even unscholarly - that this paper seeks to address and, ultimately, to subvert.
This article is grounded in the premise that as long as In a Different Voice maintains its
omnipresent status on student reading lists and in academic footnotes, conversations
about Gilligan are not only here to stay but remain essential to the development of inter-
disciplinary feminist thought.
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Taking the application of Gilligan's 'little book" as its starting
point and backdrop - a portal, if you like, through which to explore
the wider debate - this article seeks to utilize the aching familiarity
and impending doom that pervades and threatens to stifle conversa-
tions ignited by attempts of feminist legal scholars to articulate a dif-
ferent voice as a means of exploring the ongoing potential of Gilligan's
seminal work, both within law and beyond. Harnessing its "elephant
in the room"-like presence within feminist legal scholarship, the arti-
cle contends that as efforts to identify the woman lawyer's different
voice fall silent, it seems that, at least in terms of everyday legal prac-
tice, a different voice is more mythical than real. In response to and
taking its lead from Gilligan's use of literature and stories in The
Birth of Pleasure,7 this article offers through an exploration of E.B.
White's Charlotte's Web'" an alternative understanding of Gilligan's
different voice as fiction or myth. This article suggests that the on-
going promise to the law (and other academic disciplines) of a differ-
ent voice lies not in its difference per se, but rather in its ability to
render contingent particular, but dominant, forms of legal reasoning
and decision-making and to open windows onto previously unimag-
inable ways forward.
I. LAWYERING IN A DIFFERENT VOICE
The story of In a Different Voice is perhaps so familiar that it
needs no introduction. 9 Over the years it has "become part of the pro-
cess that it describes - the ongoing historical process of changing
the voice of the world by bringing women's voices into the open, thus
starting a new conversation."2 Like a fairy tale or myth, told by one
17. CAROL GILLIGAN, THE BIRTH OF PLEASURE (2002).
18. E.B. WHITE, supra note 3. Perhaps like Gilligan's In a Different Voice, the story of
Charlotte's Web needs no introduction. Described by E.B. White as "a story of friendship
and salvation on a farm," it is a tale of the relationship between a piglet called Wilbur and
Charlotte, a spider who lives in his barn. Letter from E.B. White to Readers, available
at http://www.teachervision.fen.com/authorsfletters-and-journals/1734.html (last visited
Mar. 24, 2007). Since its publication in 1952, it has been a regular fixture on primary
school reading lists, and in December 2006 the story moved to the big screen in a film
version directed by Gary Winick and starring Julia Roberts as the voice of Charlotte.
Charlotte's Web Movie, Official Site, http://www.charlotteswebmovie.com/ (last visited
Mar. 24, 2007).
19. The use of the word story is deliberate. It encompasses both the narrative or text
of In a Different Voice itself and the stories therein. See generally Jessica Benjamin, In
a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development, 9 SIGNS 297 (1989);
see also Richard Simon, Interview with Carol Gilligan, PSYCHOTHERAPY NETWORKER,
Nov.-Dec. 2002, at 50, 51-52 (noting the progress of Gilligan's 'little book" from minor
secondary course text to academic publishing sensation).
20. GILLIGAN, supra note 1, at xxvii.
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generation to the next, its narrative and its almost uncanny ability
to engender a simultaneous sense of (un)easy familiarity and alien-
ation provokes deep-seated and often conflicting responses among its
readers. From the outset, its story has been intertwined with tales of
legal personalities - lawyers, judges, claimants - and the law itself.2'
Its progression from idealistic fairy tale to dangerous myth is reflected
in, and told here through, the stories of feminist legal scholarship.
The law and legal system make perhaps their most obvious ap-
pearance in Gilligan's interviews with women who, for one reason or
another, were considering an abortion in the aftermath of the United
States Supreme Court's limited legalization of the procedure in Roe
v. Wade.22 Despite deliberate attempts to avoid any explicit assump-
tions as to the morality of the process itself and its impact on the
women's decision-making, Gilligan found that moral language, words
like good, bad, right, wrong, should, ought, "spontaneously appeared
in [the] women's narratives about the decisions that they were actu-
ally making."23 As she began to map the construction of morality im-
plied by this language, it became clear that the women's responses
were grounded in a particular understanding of the choice they were
about to make - a different voice - which was distinct from that
of the Supreme Court.24 Rather than understanding their decision as
an adversarial or hierarchical rights-based fight between themselves
as potential mothers and the fetus, the women's dilemma arose out
of their feelings of connection and responsibility toward the fetus,
"the conflict between compassion and autonomy, between virtue and
power - which the feminine voice struggles to resolve in its effort to
reclaim the self and to solve the moral problem in such a way that no
one is hurt."25 The women considered the issues of (im)morality and
(ir)responsibility of abortion in the context of their inability to main-
tain and deepen their feelings of connection with care or responsibility;
21. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on
a Women's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39, 40, 44 (1985); Joan M.
Shaughnessy, Gilligan's Travels, 7 LAW AND INEQ. 1, 13 (1989).
22. GILLIGAN, supra note 1, at 3, 64-105; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-63 (1973).
During the course of the abortion decision study, twenty-nine women (referred to the
study by pregnancy counseling services and abortion clinics) between the ages of fifteen
and thirty-three, with differing ethnic and social backgrounds, marital statuses, and with/
without children, were interviewed about their decision. See Carol Gilligan, Hearing the
Difference: Theorizing Connection, HYPATIA, Spring 1995, at 120, 121. No effort was made
to select a representative sample of the clinic/pregnancy counseling service client com-
position. Id. A year later, twenty-one of the women were re-interviewed. GILLIGAN, supra
note 1 at 3.
23. Carol Gilligan, in Isabel Marcus et al., supra note 5, at 37-38.
24. Wylie, supra note 2, at 52.
25. GILLIGAN, supra note 1, at 71.
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they viewed their decisions as neither "right" nor "good," but rather,
as the 'lesser of two evils," the "better" thing to do.26 Within this
framework, the "masculine" assumptions of detachment, hierarchy,
and principle articulated in the "rights" or "justice" approach of the
Supreme Court, at best misunderstood and at worst distorted the
situation the women saw themselves as facing. As a result, in order
to engage with and negotiate not only the legal but also the medical
and social terrain, the women had to deny their feelings of connec-
tion, care, and responsibility and adopt an unfamiliar voice, "to act as
though they did not know things that they felt they knew, and that
they did not in a sense understand issues of connection which could
not be represented within the adversarial-rights model which pitted
one life against the other."2 Put another way, their understanding of
their own reality, their focus on care, concern, and conflicting respon-
sibilities, was necessarily refrained to reflect the Court's priorities:
hierarchy, rights, and principle. Unable to speak or to be heard in
their own voices, they were forced to adopt new ones; their differ-
ence effectively silenced.
Feminist legal scholars were quick to identify with the promise of
In a Different Voice and to embrace the transformative possibilities
of a different legal voice as a means of challenging the predominance
of traditional accounts of legal reasoning and lawyering. 2 Drawing in
particular on Gilligan's conversations with perhaps her most memo-
rable and discussed research subjects, Amy and Jake, they sought to
explore the impact that the recognition of difference might have on
the personalities and structures of the legal system and academia.
As participants in her rights and responsibilities study,29 Gilligan
presented Amy and Jake with a dilemma devised by Lawrence
Kohlberg to measure moral development in adolescence: Heinz's wife
is dying and he cannot afford to buy the drug that will save her -
should he steal the drug?3" In their responses "[b]oth children... rec-
ognize the need for agreement but see it as mediated in different
ways - [Jake] impersonally through systems of logic and law, [Amy]
personally through communication in relationship."31 Jake sees the
situation to be "sort of like a math problem with humans,"32 a logical
conflict between life and property. As "a human life is worth more
26. Gilligan, in Isabel Marcus et al., supra note 5, at 38.
27. Id. at 32.
28. See, e.g., Gilligan, in Isabel Marcus et al., supra note 5.
29. GILLIGAN, supra note 1, at 3, 24-63.
30. Id. at 26.
31. Id. at 29.
32. Id. at 26.
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than money," Heinz should steal the drug, despite the fact that to do
so is to break the law.3" He abstracts and redefines the moral prob-
lem, "[t]ransposing a hierarchy of power into a hierarchy of values,
he defuses a potentially explosive conflict between people by casting
it as an impersonal conflict of claims."3 4
Amy, on the other hand, hears in Heinz's story a narrative of
fractured relationships "that must be mended with its own thread."5
Unlike Jake, she understands the dilemma in terms of how, as op-
posed to whether, Heinz should act: "should Heinz steal the drug?"3 6
Within her world of connection and care, she takes it as a given that
Heinz will act.37 She seeks a solution to the dilemma that maintains
and reinforces the "web of relationships" and responsibilities between
the parties involved. 8 In order to do so, she does what all "good" law
students know never to do - she fights the hypothetical.39 She asks
questions: why doesn't Heinz get a loan or explore the potential of
a compromise or agreement with the pharmacist?40 She considers
Heinz's responsibility to his wife: what if he gets caught and goes to
jail, who will support her then?41 She debates the role of the phar-
macist,"believing that the world should just share things more and
then people wouldn't have to steal."42
Put simply, Amy and Jake, like the United States Supreme Court
and the women in Gilligan's abortion study, hear different stories:
Jake hears Heinz's dilemma as one of conflicting claims, hierarchy,
and rights, whereas Amy listens to a tale of connection, relationship
and responsibility.43 Their differing understandings effectively trans-
form Heinz's dilemma into two distinct stories, each requiring the ap-
plication of different understandings of moral reasoning." Amy, with
her focus as much on procedure, or how the dispute is resolved, as on
substance, "seeks to keep the people engaged - she holds the needs
of the parties and their relationships constant and hopes to satisfy
them all."45 In opposition, Jake spots the legal issues.., balances the
33. Id.
34. Id. at 32.
35. Id. at 31.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 32.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 28-29.
41. Id. at 28.
42. Id. at 29.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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rights and reaches a decision - just like a lawyer should.46 In re-
sponse, Carrie Menkel-Meadow asserts that the law and legal system
with its adversarial and hierarchical nature, clear rules, winners, and
losers "represent[s] an embodiment of Jake's voice, the male voice."47
So understood, like Kolhberg, the law risks failing to listen to Amy.4"
In a world where human interaction is understood as atomistic and
competitive49 and where the behavior and success of the individual
are measured against allegedly abstract principles of justice, fair-
ness, neutrality, and reasonableness," the so-called "feminine" traits
of care and connection, articulated in Gilligan's narrative by Amy,51
are simultaneously designated and devalued. To be successful, the
woman lawyer is encouraged to deny her caring and affectionate
characteristics (if indeed she has them) and adopt the masculine tac-
tics of hierarchy, competition, and emotional detachment: "Be like
us, but not totally; join our game, play by our rules.., but not on our
team, and not on their [own] team."52 In fact, commentators assert
that if women want to compete on equal terms with men, they must
actually "play longer and harder" than their male peers.53 Like Amy
and the women in the abortion study, the woman lawyer must become
bilingual, able to distinguish between what she thinks and what she
really thinks.54
The processes of legal education are, for many, the juncture at
which this happens, where one way of knowing the world is replaced
by another:55
46. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, in Isabel Marcus, et al., supra note 5, at 54.
47. Id. at 53. Clearly, Carrie Menkel-Meadow is not suggesting here that the law and
the legal system are necessarily male, rather that they are associated with and derived
from traits commonly and often empirically, but not exclusively or universally, identified
with men. Id. at 56; see also Dana Crowley Jack & Rand Jack, Women Lawyers:
Archetype and Alternatives, in MAPPING THE MORAL DOMAIN 263, 263-88 (Carol Gilligan
et al. eds., 1988); K.C. Worden, Overshooting the Target: A Feminist Deconstruction of
Legal Education, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1141, 1142-45 (1985).
48. GILLIGAN, supra note 1, at 27-32.
49. Jack & Jack, supra note 47, at 265.
50. GILLIGAN, supra note 1, at 27.
51. Id. at 30.
52. Worden, supra note 47, at 1143, 1149.
53. Jack & Jack, supra note 47, at 267.
54. GILLIGAN, supra note 1, at 40-41.
55. This process of "eclipsing the self' by both male and female students is well docu-
mented in the literature on legal education. See PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF
REASON 126-140 (1998). See generally DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE
REPRODUCTION OF HIERARCHY 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 591 (1982). Interestingly, both Pierre
Schlag and Duncan Kennedy are silent on the gender implications of this process. At least
in his adjudicative role, the legal self is recognizably male, which means that this process
is inevitably particularly and peculiarly disorientating and alienating for women. See
MARGARET THORNTON, DISSONANCE AND DISTRUST: WOMEN IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION
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I felt it happening in law school. I honestly felt it happening. I
know people thought I was crazy, but I can remember first-year
law school - I have this feeling when I was being forced to
change my set and I can feel it. It's hard to describe but I felt it.
And I remember saying to my friends, 'They're fucking with your
brain. Can't you feel it?
56
In the groves of the legal academy, Shelia McIntyre suggests, women
learn how "to speak male as a second language... fluently,"57 to be-
come expert philologians as well as lawyers. The killer combination
of abstract legal reasoning and the 'what-goes-without-saying' of
the law school experience"58 work together to ensure that the female
would-be lawyer plays by Jake's rules and renounces her previous
"knee-jerk, passionate reactions"59 in order to think 'like a lawyer"
and adopt "the monolithic, confident voice of the 'insiders' who see
themselves as the norm and who have (often unconsciously) little
tolerance for ... diversity and difference."6 Clearly, the potential for
disassociation and disorientation in this process of extreme linguistics
is overwhelming:
its voice, tone, style is often defended as "the way lawyers
speak"... to the extent that this is the way lawyers speak, we
must conclude that we cannot be lawyers - or that we cannot
be ourselves.61
According to such a perspective, the woman lawyer is faced with an
empty choice: her self or the law.62 Torn between the prospects of
mutilation or alienation, in order to survive in Law's Empire63 the
woman lawyer, like Shakespeare's Portia,' must adopt the necessary
75-79, 268-71 (1996); Worden, supra note 47, at 1146; Edward Rubin, et al. A Conversation
Among Deans From 'Results: Legal Education, Institutional Change, and a Decade of
Gender Studies'Harvard Journal of Law and Gender Conference, March 2006, 29 HARV.
J. L. & GENDER 465, 467 (2006). It is equally arguable, however, that within the legal world
men who fail to conform to the "masculine" norm are also disadvantaged and as such be-
come "other." Richard Collier, "Nutty Professors", "Men in Suits"and "New Entrepreneurs
Corporeality, Subjectivity and Change in the Law School and Legal Practice, 7 Soc. &
LEGAL STUD. 27, 43 (1998)).
56. Jane, attorney, in Jack & Jack, supra note 47, at 271.
57. Shelia McIntyre, quoted in Worden, supra note 47, at 1145.
58. Id.
59. KENNEDY, supra note 55, at 7.
60. Jack & Jack, supra note 47, at 268.
61. Id.
62. Erika Rackley, Representations of the (Woman) Judge: Hercules, the Little Mermaid,
and the Vain and Naked Emperor, 22 LEGAL STUD. 602, 612 (2002).
63. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (Hart Publishing 1998) (1986).
64. See generally Jane M. Cohen, Feminism and Adaptive Heroism: The Paradigm of
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strategic identity.65 She must choose her tactics well, so as to play her
role unnoticed within the legal game. Increasingly, however, feminist
legal scholars began to wonder: what if she didn't? What would hap-
pen if Amy refused to play by Jake's rules? Could the woman lawyer
re-write the rules?
In her consideration of Amy's "Portia-like dissatisfaction" with
the male adversarial voice, Carrie Menkel-Meadow suggests that the
introduction of a different voice in law could lead to a radically dif-
ferent legal system, incorporating a diverse array of understandings
and perspectives.66 Amy's rejection of Jake's hierarchical ordering of
claims and refusal to "play by the adversarial rules" is seen to pro-
mote communication, relationship, and negotiation over the adjudi-
cation of winners, rights, and principles.67 So understood, her focus on
procedure as much as on the development of alternative substantive
solutions might work to ensure that the processes of legal decision-
making give greater recognition, emphasis, and legitimization to
negotiation and mediation as methods of dispute resolution.68 Advo-
cacy might come to resemble something more like a "conversation"
grounded in a relationship of trust and mutual respect, as opposed to
persuasive intimidation, dramatics, and power.69 The recognition and
acceptance that "the adversary system of justice impedes not only 'the
supposed search for truth,' but also the expression of concern for the
person on the other side,"7 might enable the courtroom battle to be
replaced with a more caring, inclusive ethic. This ethic might en-
courage an understanding of the opposing side, not as an end to be
defeated at any cost, but rather as someone to be "cared for, thought
about and dealt with,"71 enabling the lawyer to break free from the
constraints of his or her legal role, to 'lean across the adversarial
Portia as a Means of Introduction, 25 TULSA L.J. 657 (1990); Erika Rackley, Reassessing
Portia: The Iconic Potential of Shakespeare's Woman Lawyer, 11 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 25
(2003); Ian Ward, When Mercy Seasons Justice: Shakespeare's Woman Lawyer, in LEGAL
FEMINISMS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 63 (Clare McGlynn ed., 1998).
65. Jack & Jack, supra note 47, at 266; see also DANA CROWLEY JACK & RAND JACK,
MORAL VISION AND PROFESSIONAL DECISIONS: THE CHANGING VALUES OF WOMEN AND MEN
LAWYERS 133 (1989); THORNTON, supra note 55, at 106-29.
66. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 21, at 42-43; see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia
Redux: Another Look at Gender, Feminism, and Legal Ethics, 2 VA. J. SOC. POLY & L. 75,
86-87 (1994).
67. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 21, at 51; see also Naomi Cahn, Styles of Lawyering,
43 HASTINGS L. J. 1039, 1048 (1992).
68. Cahn, supra note 67, at 1048.
69. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 21, at 54.
70. Hilary, lawyer, in GILLIGAN, supra note 1, at 135.
71. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Comparative Sociology of Women Lawyers: The
"Feminization"of the Legal Profession, 24 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 897, 915 (1986).
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table and help her client's opponent., 72 Alongside this increased
awareness and understanding of the other party's perspectives and
interests, Naomi Cahn suggests that the incorporation of a different
voice in the law might also encourage greater recognition of the "rela-
tional context in which the client's problem arises" and an acknowl-
edgment of the importance of listening to, understanding, and empa-
thizing with the totality of his or her experience.73 The lawyer might
eschew mutation and compartmentalization in favor of reshaping her
legal role,74 infusing it with care as she "bleed[s] for"7 and "stand[s]
in the emotional as well as the legal shoes of [her] clients. 6
Put simply, if Amy were to re-write the rules of the legal game,
the practice and study of law might favor and prioritize cooperation
over competition, relationships over rules, nurturing over detach-
ment, dialogue over argument, mediation over confrontation, and
connection over separation. It might become less aggressive, hier-
archal, and confrontational, focusing less on the creation of abstract
disputes and binary results - on winning or losing - and more on
real issues, context, and relationships. Law's Empire 77 might become
a much nicer place to work in and/or visit, a place where people might
begin to live happily ever after.
So viewed, feminist legal scholars saw Gilligan's In a Different
Voice, particularly Amy's story, as "disrupt[ing] the apprehensible
world in order to open spaces for dreaming alternatives,"78 just like a
fairy tale. These scholars recognized the challenge Gilligan set forth,
which required readers to understand "that each time we let in a new
excluded group, that each time we listen to a new way of knowing,
we learn more about the limits of our current way of seeing."79 Allow-
ing for different ways of seeing, listening, and lawyering to radically
expand one's horizons troubles conventional understandings and as-
sumptions about law, justice, and adjudication. This paradigm shift
not only alters the rules of the game, but it also re-imagines the con-
text in which it takes place, engendering a transformative as op-
posed to an "androgynous" or "separate-but-equal" approach to moral
decision-making in which the values and priorities of each voice are
72. Menkel-Meadow, in Isabel Marcus et. al., supra note 5, at 79.
73. Cahn, supra note at 47, at 1049.
74. Jack & Jack, supra note 47, at 283.
75. Id. at 282.
76. Id. at 283.
77. DWORKIN, supra note 63.
78. MARINA WARNER, FROM THE BEAST TO THE BLONDE: ON FAIRY TALES AND THEIR
TELLERS xx (1995).
79. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Excluded Voices: New Voices in the Legal Profession
Making New Voices in the Law, 42 U. MIAMI L. REv. 29, 52 (1987).
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fused together."0 Gilligan notes: '"The inclusion of two voices in moral
discourse, in thinking about conflicts, and in making choices, trans-
forms the discourse. It is no longer either simply about justice or
simply about caring; rather, it is about bringing them together to
transform the domain."8' Within this framework, many feminist legal
scholars embraced the idea of a different voice as revealing the pos-
sibility of previously unimaginable adjudicative landscapes that are
neither fully Amy's nor Jake's, neither exclusively male nor essen-
tially female, but rather an imaginative hybrid that listens to and
identifies with polytonic voices going beyond gender in order to offer
increased opportunities for the delivery of justice.82
II. CAUGHT IN DIFFERENCE, FEARING THE FATE OF ARACHNE
The difficulty is that, despite Gilligan's arguments to the con-
trary,83 the different voice has come to be seen by many as having
an inevitably feminine intonation. Consequently, conversations as
to the potential of a different voice in the legal field have become in-
trinsically linked with debates about the particular contribution of
women lawyers, academics, and judges.8 4 This connection is perhaps
80. Gilligan, in Isabel Marcus et al., supra note 5, at 45.
81. Id.
82. Cahn, supra note 67, at 1068-69; see also Ann Shalleck, The Feminist Trans-
formation of Lawyering: A Response to Naomi Cahn, 43 HASTINGS L. J. 1071, 1072 (1992).
83. Gilligan's title, In a Different Voice, is both deliberate and accurate: "the contrasts
between male and female voices are presented here to highlight a distinction between
two modes of thought and to focus a problem of interpretation rather than to represent
a generalization about either sex." GILLIGAN, supra note 1, at 2; cf. Catherine G. Greeno
& Eleanor E. Maccoby, How Different is the "Different Voice'?, 11 SIGNS 310, 310 (1986).
Put another way, Gilligan's focus is on the dissonance between women's voices and psycho-
logical theory, as opposed to any essential differences between women and men. She does
not seek to suggest that Amy's voice is somehow "better" than Jake's. Nor that all women
do - or even should - speak and reason like Amy or that all men are like Jake. Carol
Gilligan, Reply, 11 SIGNS 324, 327 (1986).
84. See generally WOMEN IN THE WORLD'S LEGAL PROFESSIONS (Ulrike Schultz & Gisela
Shaw eds., 2003). For a discussion of the role of gender constructs within the United States
legal system, see generally Sue Davis, Do Women Judges Speak "In a Different Voice?"
Carol Gilligan, Feminist Legal Theory, and The Ninth Circuit, 8 WIS. WOMEN'S L. J. 143
(1992-1993); Herma Hill Kay & Geraldine Sparrow, Workshop on Judging: Does Gender
Make a Difference?, 16 WIS. WOMEN'S L. J. 1 (2001); Michael E. Solimine & Susan E.
Wheatly, Rethinking Feminist Judging, 70 IND. L. J. 891 (1995); and Kathryn Mickle
Werdegar, Why A Woman on the Bench?, 16 WIS. WOMEN'S L. J. 31 (2001). For inter-
national commentary on gender and the law, see CLARE MCGLYNN, THE WOMAN LAWYER:
MAKING THE DIFFERENCE (1998)(United Kingdom); THORNTON, supra note 57 (Australia);
Kate Malleson, Justifying Gender Equality on the Bench: Why Difference Won't Do, 11
FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 1 (2003)(United Kingdom); and Margaret Ann Wilkinson et al.,
Testing Theory and Debunking Stereotypes: Lawyers' Views on the Practice of Law, 18 CAN.
J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 165 (2005).
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unsurprising. After all, if all or even most women lawyers and judges
did speak as Amy, that is with something akin to Gilligan's different
voice in the face of attempts to suppress it, then an increase in the
number of women judges, lawyers, and academics would surely have
a significant impact on the adjudicative process. Thus, despite the
lack of any convincing causal link or necessary connection, for many
commentators Amy's and the woman lawyer's voice are essentially
synonymous. Attempts to identify the different voice are, neverthe-
less, highly controversial. Like most red herrings, while the idea of
a distinctive female voice is intuitively tempting or even obvious, 5
and maybe even strategically useful, ultimately it can be counter-
productive.8 6 Not only is a different voice in law difficult to find in
the first place, but we might not like it if, or when, we find it.
Cynthia Fuchs Epstein has suggested that researchers tend to
find what they are looking for, be it difference or similarity, with vari-
ation in legal behavior most likely within rather than across, gender.8 7
Alternatively, it may be that women, when they depart from tradi-
tional adversarial lawyering, are simply assumed or perceived to be
adopting peculiarly feminine, as opposed to appropriately different,
styles of lawyering. Put another way, what is seen as unremarkable
in a man is viewed as "different," or feminine, in a woman:
Not all male lawyers resort to the stereotypical aggressive, hard-
ball, 'male' style of lawyering. Many are soft-spoken and concilia-
tory in negotiations. They may be more skilled at listening than
at arguing. But when men display these varieties in lawyering
styles, it is regarded as just that - a difference in style. When
women depart from the stereotypical style of aggressive lawyer-
ing, it is more likely to be regarded as a gender difference and a
basis for questioning competence."8
Increasingly many commentators are considering the possibility
of the existence of a different voice within the law, the ability of a
woman to speak both as a woman and as a lawyer, is both "dangerous
and unanswerable."89 When the lawyer in question becomes a judge,
the stakes are even higher.9" Sandra Berns notes that "to wish for a
85. Jilda M. Aliotta, Justice O'Connor and the Equal Protection Clause: A Feminine
Voice?, 78 JUDICATURE 232, 232 (1995).
86. Malleson, supra note 84, at 2.
87. See CYNTHIA FUCHS EPSTEIN, DECEPTIVE DISTINCTIONS 39-40 (1990).
88. ABA COMMISSION ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES (1988), reprinted in Cahn, supra note 67, at 1046.
89. Sandra Day O'Connor, Portia's Progress, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1546, 1557 (1991).
90. See generally Erika Rackley, Judicial Diversity, the Woman Judge and Fairy Tale
Endings, 21 LEGAL STUDIES 74 (2007). For additional commentary on women judges see
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voice for otherness in adjudication represents a move in a profoundly
dangerous game."91 Furthermore, "to speak as a judge is to speak in
a way which cannot be bracketed... One cannot speak as a woman
(judge) or even as (woman) judge. Judge must stand alone if judgment
is to carry weight."92 In addition, more often than not the woman
judge's insistence of her decision-making uniformity and univocality
is so strong that even if she did speak with a different voice, the legal
scholar is unlikely to be able to find it.93 Like other unwelcome intrud-
ers, it is unlikely to leave explicit evidence of its presence; the adjudi-
cative process ensures that the "stigmata" of difference is obliterated.94
Moreover, anyone who dares suggest a necessary correlation between
Gilligan's different voice and that of "women" stands accused of in-
voking an essential conception of "womanhood," which is inevitably
contentious and increasingly difficult to sustain. In this way, feminist
legal scholarship seeking to introduce Amy-like qualities into the law
and the legal profession and/or system runs into the same hurdle as
Gilligan: gender essentialism.
According to anti-essentialist critics of Gilligan, the idea of a dif-
ferent voice, often misarticulated as the different voice, is an essen-
tializing myth with problematic connotations for those women who
do not identify with its features.95 Thus, while it remains pertinent
to somehow capture the essence of the feminine, in actuality this en-
capsulation excludes the polytonality of women's voices. This singular
also Susan Behuniak-Long's criticism of Sandra Day O'Connor's promulgation of a femi-
nine jurisprudence at the expense of feminist concerns (Susan Behuniak-Long, Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor and the Power of Maternal Thinking, 54 REV. POL. 417, 419 (1992));
the ongoing challenges to female members of the Canadian judiciary by the conservative
campaign group REAL (Realistic, Equal, Active, for Life) Women of Canada (REAL Women
of Canada, http://www.realwomenca.com (last visited Mar. 24, 2007)); and reactions in the
British media to the pioneering appointment of Brenda Hale to the appellate division of
the House of Lords in January 2004 (Melanie Phillips, IDeplore His Actions But Actually
His Cause is Just, DAILY MAIL, Nov. 5, 2003).
91. SANDRA BERNS, To SPEAK AS A JUDGE- DIFFERENCE, VOICE AND POWER 33 (1999).
92. Sandra Berns and Paula Baron, Bloody Bones: A Legal Ghost Story and Enter-
tainment in Two Voices - To Speak as a Judge, 2 AUSTL. FEMINIST L.J. 125, 127 (1994).
93. BERNS, supra note 91. See generally Aliotta, supra note 85; Elizabeth Halka,
Madam Justice Bertha Wilson: A "Different Voice" in the Supreme Court of Canada, 35
ALTA L. REV. 242 (1996); Erika Rackley, Difference in the House of Lords, 15 SOC. &
LEGAL STUD. 163-85 (2006); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in
Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA L. REV. 543 (1986).
94. BERNS, supra note 91, at 203.
95. See, e.g., BELL HOOKS, AIN'T I A WOMAN: BLACK WOMEN AND FEMINISM 161 (2d ed.
1983) (describing the "white female racism" that prevented black women from partici-
pating in the nineteenth century women's rights movement); Patricia A. Cain, Feminist
Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 191, 191 (1989-1990)
(noting the incompleteness of feminist legal theory because it does not include the lesbian
perspective); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN.
L. REV. 581, 584 (1990).
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description articulates a monotonic female voice, which irrevocably
flattens the plurality of female voices, silencing some while privi-
leging others. This critique stems in part from feminist unease with
the ability of women-centered approaches to strategically identify
"woman."9 The belief that any attempt to assume or discover the
shared experience of women-a woman's, or feminine, point of view -
encounters the same difficulties as the male-dominated claims to
universality it purports to challenge.9" In other words, any effort to
invoke women's experience - to speak for all women - risks
perpetuating the exclusion and marginalization of women who fall
outside these assertions. In fact, "women-centredness is potentially
as oppressive as the male-dominated discourses it seeks to displace
in presupposing a female experience which is unitary rather than
variegated - informed and shaped by a range of social, cultural and
cognitive factors (race, class, sexuality, and so on)."9
Furthermore, commentators see In a Different Voice as privi-
leging a voice that is "romantica[lly] oversimplifi[ed]"9 and, as such,
alienating to those women who fail to identify with its "highly roman-
ticized"' intonation.1" 1 Consequently, despite clear indications as
to Gilligan's "progressive" purpose seeking to "challenge" rather than
conserve or "validate" gender difference by "strategically deploy[ing
it] to unsettle existing inequities between the sexes,""1 2 some feminist
scholars reject the idea of a different voice in law as not merely inap-
propriately normative, prescriptive, and reductive, but also as facili-
tative of an inverted hierarchy in which Amy's voice is prioritized
over and deemed superior to Jake's voice. 103 Its transformative in-
sights are seen to indicate a reductive and polarized duality or dichot-
omy, which ultimately threatens to limit the development and restrict
the potential of a multi-faceted understanding of law, legal reason-
ing, and adjudication.1"4 All in all, it seems a different voice is not
96. Joanne Conaghan, Reassessing the Feminist Theoretical Project in Law, 27 J. LAW
& Soc'Y 351, 366-68 (2000).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 367.
99. Linda Kerber et al., On In a Different Voice: An Interdisciplinary Forum, 11 SIGNS
304, 309 (1986).
100. Judy Auerbach et al., On Gilligan's In a Different Voice' 11 FEMINIST STUDIES 149,
156 (1985).
101. CATHERINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DIScOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW
(1987); Greeno & Maccoby, supra note 83, at 310.
102. Frug, supra note 13, at 52-53.
103. See Kerber, supra note 99.
104. See, e.g., Auerbach, supra note 100; Greeno & Maccoby, supra note 85; Kerber,
supra note 99.
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enough. °5 Indeed, ultimately it is perhaps little more than a "set-
up" by which women are "shafted."'' 6
As a result of these complex and often contradictory voices,
feminist scholars seem destined to dice with the fate of Arachne.
1 7
These commentators are caught by the aesthetic appeal of Gilligan's
imagery, which "expresses the contradiction in our yearning for some-
thing that both connects us to each other and traps us.""'8 Mary Joe
Frug notes: 'The modifying words 'of connection' euphemistically
transform the sticky, trapping character of a spider's web into a more
agreeable landing place."'0 9 A fairy tale ending in which Jake and
Amy live happily ever after in Law's Empire seems unlikely; the in-
novative fairy tale is now a dehabilitating and restricting myth. More-
over, "like all myths, on closer examination [it is] seen to be something
of a sham;""' hence our ability to dismiss it.
Nevertheless, while a different voice in law (understood as one
that is peculiarly feminine in intonation), is not real, that is it may
only exist as a creature of our collective (or Gilligan's) imagination,
its status as a myth does not prevent it from having operative effects.
This is perhaps because as lawyers, like Dickens' Mr. Micawber, we
have already excluded ourselves from "the imaginary domain.""' In
David Copperfield, Mr. Micawber states: "My dear Mr. Copperfield ....
To a man possessed of the higher imaginative powers, the objection
to legal studies is the amount of detail which they involve .... the
mind is not at liberty to soar to any exalted form of expression.""' 2
In our rush to distance ourselves from its unfashionable essentialist
qualities and avoid the fate of Arachne, feminist legal scholars (and
others) risk becoming bewitched by what they seek to escape." 3
105. Martha Minow, in Judy Greenberg et al., Contradiction and Revision: Progressive
Feminist Legal Scholars Respond to Mary Joe Frug, 15 HARV. WOMEN'S L. J. 65, 77 (1992).
106. MacKinnon, supra note 5, at 74.
107. OVID, METAMORPHOSES 177-83 (Allen Mandelbaum trans., reprint ed. Harvest
Books 1995) (C.E. 8). Arachne was a Lydian maiden with a remarkable talent for weaving.
Id. at 177. According to Greek mythology, Athena, the goddess of weaving, challenged
her to a competition. Id. at 177-78. When Athena found Arachne's work, which explicitly
and somewhat presumptuously challenged the authority of the gods, to be faultless, she
not only destroyed it but made Arachne feel such overwhelming guilt for her actions that
she attempts to hang herself with the threads of her tapestry. Id. at 182-83. In effect,
Arachne is killed by her own web. Perhaps surprised by this reaction, Athena took pity
on her and turned Arachne into a spider. Id. at 183.
108. Liz Schneider, in Greenberg et al., supra note 105, at 72.
109. Frug, supra note 13, at 59.
110. Ward, supra note 64, at 66.
111. DRUCILLA CORNELL, THE IMAGINARYDOMAIN: ABORTION, PORNOGRAPHY & SEXUAL
HARASSMENT 80-81(1995).
112. CHARLES DICKENS, DAVID COPPERFIELD 521 (Penguin Books, 1996) (1850).
113. See supra notes 13, 107-10 and accompanying text.
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Caught in a theoretical cul-de-sac, they come to believe and alter-
nately disbelieve the myth; they accept while not fully accepting its
story at face value.'14 As feminist legal scholars seek to balance myth
and reality, they engage in "ritualistic denunciations... [and] teasing,
know-it-all dismissals"'1 5 triggered at the merest whiff of allegations
of essentialism. These rejections of a female voice are not only strate-
gically misplaced, in that they are directed at a story which may or
may not and, more importantly, need not be true, but they also oper-
ate to effectively paralyze future conversations, preventing more
detailed explorations as to where the idea of a different voice might
take us."6 So viewed, it is time perhaps to look beyond the tempting
parodies of "crude Gilliganism""' 7 in order to reexamine the promise
of In a Different Voice. In so doing, scholars should allow for the pos-
sibility that Arachne's web of "death" and self-obliteration might al-
ternatively be understood as one of care, life, and self-giving."18 One,
perhaps, like Charlotte's web.
III. ESSENTIALLY CHARLOTTE
E. B. White's Charlotte's Web is well established in the canon of
children's literature."9 It tells the story of a little girl called Fern, her
pig Wilbur, and Charlotte, a spider. 2 ° It begins with Fern dramat-
ically saving the runt of a litter of piglets, Wilbur, from "the most
terrible case of injustice"'' she had ever encountered:
"Do away with it?" shrieked Fern. 'You mean kill it? Just because
it is smaller than the others?"...
"Fern" [her father] said gently, "you will have to learn to control
yourself."
"Control myself?" yelled Fern. "This is a matter of life and death,
and you talk about controlling myself."'22
114. Id.
115. Frug, supra note 13, at 50.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Schneider, in Greenberg et al., supra note 105, at 69-72.
119. On the specific use of children's literature in legal scholarship, see IAN WARD,
LAw AND LITERATURE: POSSIBILITIES AND PERSPECTIVES ch. 5 (1995); John Morrison,
Stories for Good Children in TALL STORIES: READING LAW AND LITERATURE 113, 113
(John Morrison & Christine Bell eds., 1996); William P. MacNeil, 'Kidlit' as 'Law-and-
Lit' Harry Potter and the Scales of Justice, 14 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LIT 545, 546 (2002).
120. E. B. WHITE, supra note 3, at 8.
121. Id. at 3.
122. Id. at 1-2.
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Fern looks after and feeds Wilbur until he is big enough to sell to her
Uncle Homer down the road.' Although lonely at first without Fern,
eventually Wilbur makes some good friends, including Charlotte, who
lives in the doorway of his barn. 24 The threat of the farmer's axe,
however, is never far away, and it soon it becomes clear that Uncle
Homer wants to turn Wilbur into smoked bacon and ham:
125
Wilbur burst into tears, "I don't want to die," screamed Wilber,
throwing himself to the ground.
"You shall not die," said Charlotte, briskly.
'"What? Really?" cried Wilbur. "Who is going to save me?"
"I am," said Charlotte.' 26
And she did.
127
A few days later when one of the farm workers goes to feed
Wilbur, he notices one of Charlotte's webs glistening with tiny drops
of water.'28 He can hardly believe his eyes for in its middle, neatly
woven in capital letters, are the words "SOME PIG."'29 He calls Uncle
Homer to the barn, who concludes that it must be a miracle and that
Wilbur must, without doubt, be a very special pig indeed. 30 Not
everyone agreed with Uncle Homer's conclusion:
'"Well," said [Uncle Homer's wife], "it seems to me you're a little
off. It seems to me we have no ordinary spider."
"Oh, no" said [Uncle Homer] "It's the pig that's unusual. It says
so, right there in the middle of the web."'3 '
Over the next few weeks, Charlotte continued to leave the farmer
messages, making Wilbur a very famous and, incidentally, a prize-
winning pig.'32 And, of course, such a pig is very unlikely to become
123. Id. at 12.
124. Id. at 32-41.
125. Id. at 49.
126. Id. at 51.
127. Id. at 51.
128. Id. at 77.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 78-82.
131. Id. at 80-81.
132. Id. at 92-199.
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either smoked bacon or ham.133 At the end of the tale, Charlotte dies
knowing she kept her promise.' Wilbur is safe having become "some
pig," '135 indeed, "radiant,"'36 "terrific,"'37 and "humble"'38 just as she
had predicted in her webs. Before Charlotte dies, she speaks one last
time to Wilbur:
"Good bye!" she whispered. Then she summoned all her strength
and waved one of her front legs at him. She never moved again.
Next day, as the Ferris wheel was being taken apart... Charlotte
died. The Fair Grounds were soon deserted. The sheds and build-
ings were empty and forlorn ... Nobody, of the hundreds of people
that had visited the Fair, knew that a grey spider had played the
most important part of all. No one was with her when she died.'39
So, what does Charlotte's story add to understandings Gilligan's
In a Different Voice? Like Gilligan, Charlotte understands care as
a proactive and empowering activity, a process rather than an end
"grounded [not] in universal, abstract principles but in the daily expe-
riences and moral problems of real people in their everyday lives."140
To this end, her miraculous webs explicitly articulate her concern for
Wilbur. While Fern's justice-focused intervention at the start of the
story is only able to ensure a temporary stay of execution, Charlotte's
webs effectively engineer for Wilbur a complete reprieve from the
farmer's axe. Her messages of care, flowing from her feelings of con-
nection to Wilbur, are literally life-saving.' Her actions reflect the
delicate balance required between caring for others and caring for
self, between recognizing the danger of self-annihilation and allowing
for an understanding of care tempered by integrity in a conception
of "selflessness rooted not in a genuinely empathic regard for the
other, but rather in a harmful and injurious lack of regard for oneself:
a sense of self-loathing, a lack of self-esteem or self-respect."'42
Moreover, Charlotte's ethic of care is truly transformative. Her
recognition of her responsibility toward her friend not only reinforces
the relationships between the animals but ensures that they work
133. Id. at 92-119.
134. Id. at 163-71.
135. Id. at 77.
136. Id. at 114.
137. Id. at 94.
138. Id. at 141.
139. Id. at 171.
140. Joan C. Tronto, Beyond Gender Difference to a Theory of Care, 12 SIGNS 644, 648
(1987).
141. E.B. WHITE, supra note 3, at 3, 85.
142. ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 79 (1997).
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together to secure Wilbur's survival and ultimately also that of
Charlotte's children and grandchildren. '43 Her understanding of self
as "embedded" in relations encourages Wilbur, and even Templeton,
the self-centered, smart-talking rat,144 to temper their instinctive
individualism and locate their friendships within the context of an
ongoing web of connections and care. 14 It requires them to attempt,
however difficult, to understand themselves as connected, interdepen-
dent, and indistinct with interests stemming beyond their bounded
selves and one-to-one relationships. These ties are at once immediate
and intergenerational. In Charlotte's Web, Wilbur misses Charlotte,
but he understands that her sacrifice saved his life and future gener-
ations of her offspring:
Wilbur often thought of Charlotte. A few strands of her old web
still hung in the doorway. Every day Wilbur would stand and look
at the torn, empty web, and a lump would come to his throat....
Wilbur never forgot Charlotte. Although he loved her children and
grandchildren dearly, none of the new spiders ever quite took her
place in his heart. 146
Truly no ordinary spider, Charlotte departs from the "bloodsucking"
and "cruel" reputation of her family,'47 transforming her webs of
death into statements of care to maintain the connections and rela-
tionships that are important to her.'48 She is in a class of her own.
After all, as E. B. White concludes, 'it is not often that someone comes
along who is a true friend and a good writer. Charlotte was both. 149
The story of the friendship between Charlotte and Wilbur, like
Gilligan's In a Different Voice, can be seen to offer a glimpse into an
alternative reality where connection, care, empathy, and responsibil-
ity might exist alongside separation, rights, and justice; where rela-
tionships might be understood in terms of webs as opposed to ladders;
where justice is caring and care is just and where the defiled and ex-
cluded are valorised and able to sing. 5 ° Like the women in Gilligan's
abortion study, Charlotte's understanding of self eschews the ab-
stracted individualism of the law and legal system. Moreover, her
subsequent success, notably the fact that she saves Wilbur, evidences
143. E.B. WHITE, supra note 3, at 163-71.
144. Id. at 171, 183.
145. Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities,
1 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 7, 10 (1989).
146. E.B. WHITE, supra note 3, at 172-73, 184.
147. Id. at 39-40.
148. Id. at 114-15.
149. Id. at 184.
150. WEST, supra note 142, at 24.
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the power and strategic importance of difference in attempts to re-
imagine the adjudicative process.'5 ' As such, the story of Charlotte's
Web provides an imaginative illustration of the ongoing promise of
a different voice, restoring the transformative potential of Gilligan's
narrative from the taint of its essentialist associations. E.B. White's
novel introduces the possibilities of interwoven ethics of justice and
care free from restrictive invocations of gender categories. By in-
cluding "normal aspect[s] of human existence,"'52 judges would be
able to inform political change and initiate the transformation of our
conceptions of law, justice, politics, and morality.'53
With this interpretation in mind, the purpose of this article is not
simply one of comparison or quirky juxtaposition. Rather, its goal is
to locate conversations about difference and Gilligan firmly within
the imaginary domain, that is to establish the imagination as an im-
portant site of discursive/political struggle that can be harnessed for
ideological purposes by offering Charlotte's story as an alternative to
that of Arachne, a catalyst to provoke thought and extend debate. In
other words, this article contends that the responses to Gilligan and,
in particular, her articulation of a different voice by feminist scholars
are as much derived from the imagination as they are from what is
conventionally considered as rational thought. Reactions to In a
Different Voice, whether positive or negative, are as much instinc-
tive as reasoned. Furthermore, as Catherine MacKinnon suggests,
perhaps what scholars hate the most about Gilligan's work is that it
is true;' its instinctive familiarity and unnerving accuracy is attrac-
tively subversive and frustratingly paralyzing in equal measure.'55
As a result, feminist legal scholars, and others, are caught in differ-
ence, at once desperate to eschew the uncritical and old-fashioned
feminism of In a Different Voice, and at the same time being forced
to engage with it to start new conversations.'56 Put bluntly, however
much we dislike it, its mythical status and credentials ensure that
it continues to demand our attention. This may not, however, be a
bad thing.
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SPIDERS, MYTHS, AND GILLIGAN: CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Typically, to say something is a myth or mythical is more often
than not a prelude to its dismissal as a sensible or rational idea: a
myth is most immediately understood as untrue. Richard Cavendish
argues that "[o]ne of the disadvantages of the old-fashioned deroga-
tory use of the word myth, to mean a foolish story or a false idea is
the implication that myths are trivial. The reality is the reverse."'57
In fact, while the story of a myth is "generally agreed to be fiction," it
nevertheless is a "fiction which is full of meaning," an "imaginative
tradition" revealing "truths of a different or deeper kind;""15 hence
their appeal and longevity. As such, the transformative potential of
Gilligan's narrative does not lie in its reality, in the widespread accep-
tance of its findings or its literal, historic or even scientific "truth,"
but rather in its unreality, where its story takes us, and in its ability
"[to] illuminate aspects of our human condition" that we might other-
wise overlook or downplay.15 The purpose or power of a myth extends
beyond and is largely independent from its story, which may or may
not be true. In other words, understood as fiction or myth, the promise
of a different voice lies in exactly that: its promise."6 Its potential lies
in its "poetic" rather than "literal" truth,16" ' its story exploring the pos-
sibility of where a different voice might take us. The promise of the
narrative of In a Different Voice lies not in the truth of its story, in the
ability to identify and/or articulate a definitive, different, and, presum-
ably, female voice (as some feminist and other legal commentators
had imagined), but rather in the extent to which it renders contingent
particular, but dominant, forms of moral and/or legal reasoning. In
this way, the idea of a different voice acts as a catalyst for disruption;
silencing monotony and destabilizing taken-for-granted assumptions.
In operating to subvert the prejudice, bias, and hierarchy of tradi-
tional adjudicative approaches and moral reasoning, it uncovers and
illuminates new ways of seeing, speaking, and even lawyering. Its
story, while generally agreed to be a contrivance that no one wholly
believes, brings with it the possibility for feminist scholars not only
157. MYTHOLOGY: AN ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE PRINCIPAL MYTHS AND
RELIGIONS OF THE WORLD 8 (Richard Cavendish ed., 1992). Although a myth is tradi-
tionally understood as a story, it can also be understood as a tradition, "which exerts a
powerful influence on attitudes to life, but whose literal accuracy there is reason to doubt,"
for example, the traditional Christian picture of hell. Id. at 9.
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FROM ARACHNE TO CHARLOTTE
to evade the crisis of subjectivity and the fate of Arachne, but also
to explore concrete insights into the realities of morality, politics,
law, and justice and thereby the opportunity to begin to imagine the
previously unimaginable, to begin to ask: "but, what if...?"
Within this framework, despite its unfashionable philogyny and
albeit unintentional essentializing tendencies, Gilligan's idea of a dif-
ferent voice continues to deliver, although not necessarily in the way
feminist and other commentators might have imagined. As relevant
and provocative today as it was twenty-five years ago, the narrative
of In a Different Voice continues to capture and constrain the imagina-
tions of new generations of women. Its tale of recognition, disillusion,
and rehabilitation, explored here alongside attempts to identify a dif-
ferent voice in the law, remains a fundamental part of any conver-
sation that includes women and/or difference. As a result, to many
scholars this insidious presence within feminist legal scholarship has
become a Hydra-like menace, which threatens to entrap unfolding
stories within theoretical culs-de-sac or to block their progress. Its
haunting and haunted narrative pulls conversations toward the folly
of essential difference and the siren call of the elusive 'feminine" voice.
Nevertheless, like Wilbur, Gilligan's idea of a different voice is,
in fact, humble, radiant, and even, perhaps, terrific. Its stories, like
the eponymous heroine of Charlotte's Web, spin webs of proactive care
and empowered responsibility, encouraging us to consider where a dif-
ferent voice might take us. It urges us to embrace its transformative
possibilities, to look away from difference and focus instead on what
difference is different to. So viewed, what the stories of Charlotte's
webs and Gilligan's different voice reveal is the importance of where
you look. After all, as the farmer's wife pointed out, it was Charlotte -
not Wilbur - who was extraordinary.'62 Put bluntly, Wilbur was
only "some pig" because Charlotte's web said so. Had Charlotte kept
quiet or, alternately, had her writing talent been recognized, the story
would have turned out very differently, especially for Wilbur. In short,
for Charlotte's plan to work she had to be seen as a very common,
very ordinary, grey spider. Similarly, the ongoing promise and impor-
tance of Gilligan's little book does not rest on our ability to articulate
or define, let alone believe in, the "difference" of a different voice. Like
all myths, the reality of its story is neither here nor there. In fact, for
Charlotte's or indeed any "trick"'63 to be truly effective, what the idea
of a different voice requires is strategic displacement, for us to look in
the 'wrong' direction. Perhaps, then, Sandra Berns is right: "the whole
162. E.B. WHITE, supra note 3, at 80.
163. Id. at 85.
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idea of a different voice [is] part of the problem" seducing women
away from what is really going on, that is "how all those men came to
believe that they were speaking.., in some universal and objective
sense when they were simply speaking as men."' 4 In other words,
what is important is not our ability to hear or even speak in a differ-
ent voice, but rather the extent to which the possibility of difference
reveals and amplifies the deafening silence underpinning traditional
understandings of, for example, reason, law, justice, imagination, and
so on. Recognizing that difference may exist throws light onto paths
as yet unexplored; opening, and then stepping back from, a window
on to new adventures. Where we go from here is the beginning of
another story.
164. BERNS, supra note 91, at 13.
